报告主题：Earnings management through real activities manipulation

报告人：徐燕，外聘教师，澳大利亚科廷科技大学财务学博士

时间：2011年12月1日（星期四）13:30—16:00PM

地点：综合楼802会议室

参加者：学院青年博士老师为主体、院在读研究生为辅。欢迎其他老师和同学参加。

ABSTRACT: I find evidence consistent with managers manipulating real activities to avoid reporting annuallosses. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting price discounts to temporarily increase sales, over production to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary expenditures to improve reported margins. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that these activities are less prevalent in the presence of sophisticated investors. Other factors that influence real activities manipulation includes industry membership, the stock of inventories and receivables, and incentives to meet zero earnings. There is also some, though less robust, evidence of real activities manipulation to meet annual analyst forecasts.