报告主题：Mandatory Repurchase Disclosure and the Useof Share Repurchases as an Earnings Management Device （强制回购披露与作为盈余管理手段的股份回购的运用）

报告人：Hong Xie, Gatton College of Business andEconomics, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506

时间：2018年6月7日（星期四），14：00-16：00

举行地点：综合楼802会议室 

内容提要: 

In December 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC) amended Rule 10b-18, which significantly enhanced the disclosure ofrepurchase transactions. We hypothesize and find that the enhanced disclosureof repurchase activities curtails firms’ use of repurchases as an earningsmanagement device to meet or beat analyst forecast benchmarks (Hribar, Jenkins,and Johnson, 2006) in the high disclosure period post the amendment relative tothe low disclosure period before the amendment. In addition, the enhanceddisclosure of repurchase activities alleviates the real consequences ofrepurchases(decreases in employment, capital expenditures, and R&Dexpenditures) in the high disclosure period relative to the low disclosureperiod. Moreover, the enhanced disclosure enables the market to discountearnings surprises induced by repurchases (Hribar et al., 2006) more severelyin the high disclosure period relative to the low disclosure period. Overall,our findings are consistent with the SEC’s 2003 amendment having mitigatedfirms’ repurchase-based earnings management behavior, alleviated the negativereal consequences of repurchases, and helped market participants detect anddiscount the portion of earnings surprises induced by share repurchase-basedearnings management.